An assessment of the Innovation Union Scoreboard as a tool to analyse national innovation capacities: The case of Switzerland by Foray, Dominique & Hollanders, Hugo
An assessment of the Innovation
Union Scoreboard as a tool to
analyse national innovation
capacities: The case of Switzerland
Dominique Foray1,* and Hugo Hollanders2
1College of Management, EPFL, Lausanne 1015, Switzerland and 2Maastricht Economic Research
Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT), Maastricht University, Keizer Karelplein
19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands
*Corresponding author. Email: Dominique.foray@epfl.ch
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about national innovation capacities in the case of given countries. It clarifies what this statistical
framework can offer in terms of information and insights on strengths and weaknesses of a given
country relative to the other countries which are also involved in this statistical exercise. The
investigation is carried out through the case study of Switzerland; a country that is leading the IUS
ranking for many years. The approach will therefore start with the full analysis of the IUS results
for Switzerland. Then other statistical evidence as well as qualitative insights will be added to the
discussion to identify what really matters to explain success and the potential weaknesses the
Swiss policy should care about. The conclusion is that if the IUS can be considered as an
important tool to inform innovation policies, it should not be applied in an isolated manner or
without relying on other types of indicators and information on the system considered.
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1. Introduction1
This article investigates the Innovation Union Scoreboard
(IUS) as a tool to carry out case studies about national
innovation capacities (NICs) in the case of given countries.
NIC is deﬁned by Furman et al. (2002) as ‘the ability of a
country to produce and commercialize a ﬂow of innovative
technology over the long term’. It is, therefore, a broad
concept that aims to capture most of the factors that
matter as determinant of innovation performance at
national level. Because the notion of ‘factors that matter’
can be subject to some variations among economists and
innovation experts, the concept of NIC is certainly less
simple or easy than other related ones such as scientiﬁc
capacities or R&D capacities. However, in most interpret-
ations of what an NIC needs to capture are the following
determinants: (1) the framework economic conditions such
as ﬁnance, competition, labour market, openness to inter-
national trade; (2) the science and knowledge infrastructure
[Universities and public research organizations (PROs),
transfer of technology]; (3) the capabilities of companies
in terms of knowledge absorption and production (R&D
intensity, cooperation, cluster-speciﬁc innovation environ-
ment); (4) the level and composition of human capital.
Our article aims at clarifying what the IUS statistical
framework can offer in terms of information and insights
on strengths and weaknesses of the NIC of given country
relative to the other countries which are also involved in this
statistical exercise. But this article invites also readers to
think beyond this statistical framework. Indeed, its
strengths—synthetic character, temporal stability, and inter-
national comparability represent also potential weaknesses
of the indicator: several crucial factors and conditions are
not easily observable within this statistical framework. This
is why the measures of strengths and weaknesses of the
country must be completed by other measures as well as
enriched with more contextual data and information in
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order to get a better picture of the ‘fundamentals’ of the
country that can explain its capacity of innovation and help
to predict its innovative performance.
Our conclusion is that if the IUS can be considered as an
important tool to inform innovation policies, it should not
be applied in an isolated manner or without relying on
other types of indicators and information on the system
considered. Our demonstration is carried out through the
case study of Switzerland; a country that is leading the IUS
ranking for many years. Looking at its performance as
measured by the IUS, it would be tempting to think that
Switzerland is ‘well served’ by the IUS. However, some
fundamentals as well as best practices that characterize
the Swiss innovation capacity are not so well observable
and measured in the IUS framework.
The approach will start with the full analysis of the IUS
results for Switzerland: ‘let IUS talk ﬁrst and signal
weaknesses and strengths’. Then other statistical evidence
as well as qualitative insights will be added to the discussion
to identify what really matters to explain success and the
potential weaknesses the Swiss policy should care about.
2. The IUS’ design and underlying structure
2.1 IUS: a short presentation of its structure and
operation
This section provides general insights about the IUS. The
IUS provides a comparative assessment of the innovation
performance of the European Union’s (EU) 28 member
states and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their
research and innovation systems. IUS uses 25 research and
innovation-related indicators and covers the EU 28
member states as well as Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey,
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
The indicators are grouped into three main categories
(see Fig. 1):
. ‘Enablers’, the basic building blocks which allow in-
novation to take place.
. ‘Firm activities’ which show how innovative Europe’s
ﬁrms are.
. ‘Outputs’ which show the beneﬁts for the economy at
large.
Descriptions for each category can be found in the
Annex of the IUS report.2
Based on the underlying structure presented above and
the data series for each country, the following approach is
used in the IUS to calculate innovation performance (see
Supplementary Appendix 1).
(1) Identify and replace positive and negative outliers.
(2) Set reference years (those years for which most recent
data are available).
(3) Impute missing values (but only if data are available
for at least 1 year over the 5-year observation period).
(4) Determine the highest and lowest scores for all
countries.
(5) Transform those indicators for which the data distri-
bution is highly skewed.
(6) Normalize the data by recalculating all data to the
same 0–1 range by ﬁrst subtracting the lowest score
and then dividing by the difference between the
highest and lowest score.
(7) The Summary Innovation Index (SII) is the average
of the normalized scores for all indicators.
On the basis of this calculation, each country’s innovation
performance is captured by a composite index measuring
innovation performance, the SII. Based on the index value,
countries can be classiﬁed in one of four performance groups
(leaders, followers, moderate, and modest). The results of
the IUS 2011 are presented in the Fig. 2.3
One important contribution of the innovation index is
not only about static comparisons but about the possibility
of having a dynamic view of countries’ innovation per-
formance. In other words, the IUS structure provides the
possibility to estimate growth rates of the index (see
Supplementary Appendix 2).
2.2 A little warning: on the usual mistakes made by
policymakers in the interpretation of results
Indicators have to be interpreted with care. It is obvious
that ‘more’ is not always better. No country would beneﬁt
if all of its people would have a completed tertiary educa-
tion or if R&D expenditures would amount to 50% of
GDP. Clearly, for most indicators, there must be some
kind of U-shape performance curve where at low levels it
is worthwhile to improve the performance level but from
some level onwards further improvements lead to
inefﬁciencies. This directly applies to all the IUS indicators
which are expressed as percentage scores between 0% and
100%. Having a high share of innovating ﬁrms seems de-
sirable, but if all ﬁrms innovate without all of them having
the capacities to do so will lead to an inefﬁcient allocation
of the resources available for innovation. The difﬁculty is
that for none of the indicators this turning point in the U-
curve is known. If a country has already passed this
turning point, it could well be that policies should aim at
decreasing performance instead of improving it. A possible
case is the high R&D intensities in Finland and Sweden.
Although a signiﬁcant share of these countries’ GDP is
spent on R&D activities, per capita income is not among
the highest in Europe. One could argue that these countries
have been overinvesting in their R&D activities.
For several countries, the share of their population aged
30–34 years having completed tertiary education might be
reaching the above-mentioned turning point. In Ireland,
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, the
indicator is already above 45%, and in Switzerland, the
44.2% might also be close to this turning point.
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Educational policies might therefore better aim at
improving the quality of graduates instead of fur-
ther increasing the number of graduates. A similar
argument could be made for new doctorate graduates
where Sweden and Switzerland are the only countries
with a share above 3%.
Differences in indicator scores can also be explained by
differences in institutional settings. Depending on e.g. the
industrial structure, a country having high shares of R&D-
intensive industries will almost automatically perform
better in patent applications (and to a lesser extent in
scientiﬁc publications). Government policies simply
Figure 1. Framework of the IUS.
Figure 2. Countries’ innovation performance (2011).
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promoting ﬁrms to apply for patents where the industry
mix is focused towards R&D-extensive industries are
doomed to fail. More long-run oriented industrial
policies would be needed to trigger structural change
leading to an increase in R&D and/or knowledge-intensive
industries.
Another mistake commonly made is that policies aim at
companies or people within a particular country but
borders as such are becoming less and less important due
to the increasing globalization. With companies and people
being able to move their activities almost freely from one
country to another, national policies are becoming less and
less effective as they are in open competition with similar
policies in neighbouring countries. Increasing R&D
subsidies will fail to be effective if all countries do so and
will only lead to replacing privately funded by publicly
funded business R&D. A harmonized cross border
approach might be more effective, e.g. as the European
Commission (EC) is trying to do for the EU member states.
Other indicators favour small countries compared to
large countries, such as the indicator on international co-
publications. For these indicators, performance compari-
sons should be made only with countries of a similar size.
Not choosing the proper set of benchmark countries will
lead to erroneous conclusions and, even worse, to inappro-
priate or ineffective policies. This argument is relevant for
Switzerland in particular which—given its relatively small
size and specialized industrial structure—cannot and
should not be directly compared with larger countries
like Germany and the UK.
2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of IUS
It would be inaccurate to say that IUS provides a biased
view of innovation. The set of indicators that are mobilized
here are not emphasizing only science-driven innovation;
they are not only capturing formal R&D and patents;
ﬁnally the underlying structure does not reﬂect the
famous linear model of innovation, which was discarded
a long time ago by scholarly works of Rosenberg, Nelson,
etc. With IUS, and given observation and measurement
constraints and limitations, one tries to reﬂect the multidi-
mensional nature of innovation conditions, inputs, proced-
ures, and outputs.
However, a composite indicator is by its very nature
complex and can raise issues dealing with the relationship
between the indicator and the underlying concept of
interest (NIC). Jaffe (1999) identiﬁes a set of criteria for
a ‘good’ indicator. Among these criteria, a ‘good’
indicator:
- Should be as precise as possible, that is, it should bear
a tight relationship with the underlying concept or have
a high ‘signal-to-noise ratio’.
- Should not be susceptible to manipulation. In other
words, we must be concerned about the possibility
that the act of measurement may inﬂuence the process
being observed.
- Should be as transparent as possible. Potential users
(i.e. policymakers) can understand its mode of produc-
tion and can use it properly for future policy decisions.
Of course—there is no surprise here—a composite indi-
cator will hardly meet these three characteristics. However,
this fact has to be accepted and managed as the unavoid-
able consequence of a challenging measurement problem:
capturing the multi-dimensionality of a concept and at-
tempting to translate it into a single metric.
By its very nature a composite indicator makes the
weighting scheme very critical, and ﬁnal results
(rankings) can be very sensitive to weighting variations.
A robustness analysis using randomly sampled weights
has shown that countries have relatively stable ranks
which only ﬂuctuate within groups consisting of a small
number of countries (Hollanders and Tarantola 2011).
Sajeva et al. (2005) analysing an earlier version of the
IUS have also shown that the use of different weighting
schemes has no real effect on the ranking of countries. A
scheme using equal weights for each of the indicators is the
most easy and transparent weighting scheme (see
Supplementary Appendix 3).
It is also true that the use of IUS for policy purposes is
subject to severe limitations, and there are many mistakes
that can be made by ‘over-interpreting’ the results (see
above). And even in an ideal world of reliable and consist-
ent data series and of rigorous statistical treatments, the
IUS will miss some strengths and some weaknesses in a
particular country’s case. After all, the IUS is a standard
framework designed to accommodate a huge diversity of
national contexts and situations and it is likely that it will
miss some speciﬁc aspects in any country.
Finally, several things that matter in terms of innovation
performance are imperfectly captured for obvious reasons
of data and measurement problems. The statistical picture
as provided by IUS needs, therefore, to be completed by
looking beyond the ‘IUS observation perimeter’. This is
what will be done in the next sections. Section 3 describes
what IUS only is telling us about Swiss strengths and
weaknesses while section 4 will complete the picture with
additional data sources and qualitative insights.
2.4 Identifying the feasibility space of innovation
policy
It is also useful to note that some of the indicators reﬂect
facts that can be changed through good policymaking in
the long term or even in the short term. Some other indi-
cators are reﬂecting facts that are more ‘resistant’ to any
policy intervention simply because policy in these cases
would have to aim at structural changes and major trans-
formations. Such a taxonomy—which is beyond the scope
of this article—would help to identify the ‘feasibility space’
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of the innovation policy of any considered country.
This space is not only deﬁned by the relative positions
(strength and weaknesses) of the country that matter in
terms of policy but also by the fact that some indicators
reﬂect features that can be improved ‘easily’ while some
others reﬂect structural features of the system on which
policy will only have little inﬂuence even in the long term
(see Supplementary Appendix 4). In other words, there is
gap between the frame of indicators and the ‘feasibility’ of
the policy. This gap needs to be understood by pol-
icymakers (Arundel and Hollanders 2005).
2.5 The competitive advantages of IUS today vis-a-vis
other approaches
Given the several limitations just mentioned, it is logical to
ask whether other approaches to measure NIC are ‘super-
ior’, that is to say can manage in a better way the tension
between the need to capture a multi-dimensional and
complex phenomenon and the criteria that are required
to have a good indicator (precision, transparency, etc.).
For instance, Furman et al. (2002) propose an approach to
measure NICs—consisting in the nation’s common innov-
ation infrastructure, the cluster-speciﬁc environment for in-
novation and the strength of linkages between these two. The
goal of the approach is to estimate the relationship between
international patenting and observable contributors to
national innovative capacity. While challenging and interest-
ing as an academic exercise and even as a set of guidelines
and instructions for studying one particular country’s innov-
ation performance, this approach will fail in a similar way
at meeting all criteria of precision, transparency, and non-
manipulability. Furthermore, the underlying structure of
variables (to measure national innovative capacity) makes
this approach not easy to repeat over time so as to get
inter-temporal comparisons and to measure progress over
time and between countries.
In the business of indicators, the proof is in the use and
in the practice: IUS is supported by an international data
infrastructure which is shared and maintained by an ex-
panding community of experts and practitioners. It has
proven its ability to be produced in a very large number
of countries and to be repeated every year while not raising
any major issue of stability of the relationship between the
indicator and the underlying concept. IUS has been suc-
cessful in passing the initial phase of conception and pilot
study (the ﬁrst IUS was piloted in 2000) which always
entails high ﬁxed costs. It has also passed successfully the
phase of enrolling ﬁrst users and adopters and increasing
the size of the community of countries interested in being
involved in the project. As such it entered a phase of
increasing returns: as the IUS indicator is adopted and
used in a wider community, more complementary activities
(training) and services (statistics provision) are developing,
and higher attraction is generated on additional users and
policymakers who are eager to use it to be ‘comparable’.
In that sense, IUS has today a clear competitive advantage
on most other composite indexes which never got so much
attraction. The most recent attempt undertaken by a con-
sortium of institutions (Cornell University, INSEAD,
WIPO 2014) to develop a Global Innovation Index is just
a good illustration of the fact that the ﬁrst phase of
building and using a new indicator—which has
demonstrated its relevance and some practical merits—is
extremely perilous. Many failures characterize the market
for indicators, most of them stemming from problems of
increasing returns (Foray 2007). Because the IUS has
acquired a dominant position (at least in Europe), it will
be difﬁcult for alternatives to compete successfully
whatever merits they can show.
In addition, IUS is one of the few reports which consist-
ently have been using data from innovation surveys, in
particular the Community Innovation Survey which
collects ﬁrm-level data on innovation activities for most
European countries. Only innovation survey data can ad-
equately capture the effects or output of innovation.
Reports not using such data, as the Global Innovation
Index, fail in capturing the output of innovation
(Hollanders and Janz 2013).
3. IUS insights: what can we learn from the
statistics about the Swiss innovation
capacity?
The ﬁrst step involves ‘only’ extracting information
and signals from IUS about strengths and
weaknesses: how the system is performing as we know it
from the IUS 2011 report? This approach involves three
steps.
3.1 Which indicators are primarily responsible for the
proper position of Switzerland in the ranking of IUS?
Each of the 24 IUS 2011 indicators (for one indicator—
fast-growing innovative ﬁrms—data are not available)
contributes equally to the SII. The relative contribution
of each of the indicators can easily be shown in a radar
graph. An indicator with a normalized value above (below)
the SII score contributes more (less) to the SII. The indi-
cators with the lowest normalized scores will contribute
‘negatively’ to the SII; those with the highest normalized
scores contribute ‘positively’. Figure 3 shows the indicators
which are responsible for the strong performance of
Switzerland in the IUS.
For each of these ‘strong’ indicators, we compare
Switzerland with the top-5 best performing countries to
identify possible performance gaps to better performing
countries (the data in the tables below ﬁrst show the real
indicator and in brackets the normalized score):
. New doctorate graduates: Switzerland is already the best
performing country with 3.6 new doctorate graduates.
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As this value is higher than the mean score across all
countries plus 2 times the standard deviation, the value
for Switzerland is considered an outlier, and in the nor-
malization process, Switzerland receives a score of 1.000
just as Sweden.
Switzerland Sweden Finland Portugal Germany
3.6 (1.000) 3.1 (1.000) 2.9 (0.935) 2.7 (0.871) 2.6 (0.839)
. International scientiﬁc co-publications: Switzerland is
the second-best performing country with 2,309 interna-
tional scientiﬁc co-publications only just below
Iceland’s 2,311 publications.
Iceland Switzerland Denmark Sweden Norway
2,311 (1.000) 2,309 (1.000) 1,533 (0.984) 1,485 (0.952) 1,386 (0.887)
. Top 10% most cited scientiﬁc publications worldwide:
Switzerland is already the best performing country with
15.6 publications among the most cited publications
worldwide having a signiﬁcant lead over the
Netherlands.
Switzerland Netherlands Denmark Belgium UK
15.6 (0.991) 14.9 (0.943) 14.8 (0.932) 13.4 (0.833) 12.8 (0.790)
. Non-domestic doctorate students: Switzerland is
already the best performing country with 47% of doc-
torate students coming from abroad. The strong Swiss
performance however needs to be interpreted with care
as the indicator measures the share of non-EU doctor-
ate students for the EU member states. For EU
member states, it is thus more difﬁcult to score as
high as Switzerland does.
Switzerland UK Norway Norway Iceland
47.0 (1.000) 31.6 (1.000) 34.3 (1.000) 29.1 (0.973) 23.0 (0.863)
. R&D expenditure in the business sector: Switzerland is
the third-best performing country. Finland and Sweden
spent a higher share of their GDP on business R&D.
Finland Sweden Switzerland Denmark Germany
2.69 (1.000) 2.35 (1.000) 2.20 (0.935) 2.08 (0.884) 1.90 (0.806)
. Public–private scientiﬁc co-publications: Switzerland is
already the best performing country with almost 200
public–private co-publications.
Switzerland Iceland Denmark Sweden Norway
198.5 (1.000) 170.0 (1.000) 123.2 (0.987) 117.3 (0.960) 110.6 (0.930)
Figure 3. ‘Strong’ indicators—Switzerland (2011).
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. Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patents applications:
Switzerland’s 8.18 patent applications put the country
in the third place signiﬁcantly below the performance
of Finland and Sweden.
Sweden Finland Switzerland Denmark Germany
10.53 (1.000) 9.57 (1.000) 8.18 (0.945) 7.52 (0.900) 7.04 (0.866)
. PCT patent applications in societal challenges:
Switzerland’s 2.56 patent applications put the country
in second place, just below Denmark.
Denmark Switzerland Sweden Netherlands Germany
2.65 (1.000) 2.56 (1.000) 2.02 (1.000) 1.11 (0.783) 1.00 (0.745)
. Community trademarks: Switzerland performs well
below Malta and Luxembourg. These countries’ high
performance could be due to their very small country
size, making it impossible for Switzerland to match.
Luxembourg Malta Cyprus Switzerland Austria
24.03 (1.000) 16.31 (1.000) 13.43 (1.000) 11.46 (0.923) 9.87 (0.794)
. Community designs: Switzerland is the third-best per-
forming country, and performance is very close to that
of Germany but the gap with Austria is more signiﬁcant.
Austria Germany Switzerland Denmark Italy
8.64 (1.000) 7.90 (0.934) 7.81 (0.924) 7.43 (0.879) 6.86 (0.812)
. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) introducing
product or process innovations: Switzerland is already
the best performing country with 57% of SMEs having
introduced a product or process innovation.
Switzerland Germany Portugal Belgium Estonia
57.0 (1.000) 53.6 (0.981) 47.7 (0.834) 44.0 (0.741) 43.9 (0.738)
. Employment in knowledge-intensive activities:
Switzerland is in the second place with almost 20%
of employment in knowledge-intensive activities
Luxembourg is the best performer with more than
25% of employment in such activities.
Luxembourg Switzerland Ireland Iceland Sweden
25.7 (1.000) 19.9 (1.000) 19.5 (0.974) 18.1 (0.881) 17.1 (0.815)
. Sales of new-to-market and new-to-ﬁrm innovations:
Switzerland is in the second place with almost 25%
of ﬁrms’ turnover coming from innovations. Only
Greece is showing a better performance.
Greece Switzerland Czech Republic Germany Hungary
25.6 (1.000) 24.9 (1.000) 18.7 (0.961) 17.4 (0.872) 16.4 (0.807)
. Licence and patent revenues from abroad: Switzerland
is already the best performing country followed by the
Netherlands.
Switzerland Netherlands Iceland Sweden Luxembourg
3.62 (1.000) 2.77 (1.000) 1.17 (0.825) 1.12 (0.807) 0.96 (0.746)
3.2 Best and worst performing countries
The SII is a relative performance measure where a
country’s normalized score depends on the performance
of the best and worst performing country in the sample.
We have identiﬁed these best and worst performing
countries for each indicator and have shown the impact
of an improvement of 10% of the best performing country
or a worsening of 10% of the worst performing country on
the Swiss SII score.
Table 1 below summarizes these results.4 It is obvious
that there is not much to gain for Switzerland’s SII score if
the worst performing countries would perform even worse.
Switzerland has more to lose if the best performing
countries improve their performance, in particular for
the share of population aged 30–34 years with completed
tertiary education, PCT patent applications, and the em-
ployment share in knowledge-intensive activities.
3.3 Are there in the current results already visible
signs of weakening?
A direct comparison of the SII scores of Switzerland and
the other innovation leaders (Fig. 4) shows that
Switzerland has increased its lead to Sweden and
Denmark and has kept a stable lead over Germany and
Finland. Similar comparisons can be made for each of the
individual indicators to indicate areas where Switzerland
might be losing its lead to competing countries.
There are no clear signs in the IUS 2011 report that
Switzerland is weakening, a result which is conﬁrmed by
Fig. 5 showing current IUS performance on the vertical
axis and IUS growth performance on the vertical axis.5
Switzerland’s innovation performance is improving as
fast as that of the EU 27 (represented by the two dotted
lines).
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3.4 Due to what reasons/indicators could Switzerland
lose its leading position in Europe?
From a statistical point of view, those indicators with a
below average normalized value and growing at a negative
rate are endangering the good position of Switzerland.
Table 2 shows three indicators in particular that put
Switzerland at risk from a ‘narrow IUS’ point of view:
Share of SMEs innovating in-house; share of innovative
SMEs collaborating with others; and share of knowledge-
intensive services exports.
It is obvious that the narrow view developed in this
section has to be interpreted with care before drawing
more general conclusions. Switzerland might have a
relative weak performance in SMEs innovating in-house
and SMEs collaborating with others, but the country is
performing among the best countries when it comes to
the share of ﬁrms introducing a product or process innov-
ation. Ultimately, the share of innovating ﬁrms is more
important than how they innovate, so further investigation
is needed to better understand the weak performance in the
ﬁrst two indicators and whether this weak performance is
relevant at all.6 At the same time, collaboration is import-
ant as it enables ﬁrms to tap into a broader range of know-
ledge and as it will stimulate knowledge diffusion between
the collaborating ﬁrms.
4. From statistical to policy relevance
Some IUS indicators—either strong or weak—need to be
carefully analysed before any interpretation and recom-
mendation can be given. In particular, they need to be
put in context. A contextual analysis can show that
speciﬁc weaknesses might not be problematic while
strengths might involve elements of fragility. We are de-
veloping this contextual analysis in the case of Switzerland
for four indicators below. It is also useful to try to generate
new insights beyond the IUS ‘observation perimeter’ to
highlight key features that are only partially measured
within the IUS framework. Finally, we have to take into
account that while some indicators reﬂect facts that can be
changed through policies, some other indicators are
Table 1. The effect on the Swiss SII of a 10% improvement of the best
performing or 10% worsening of the worst performing country
IUS indicator Best country Worst
country
+10% 10%
New doctorate graduates 0.004 /
Population aged 30–34 years with
completed tertiary education
0.005 0.000
Youth aged 20–24 years with at
least upper secondary level education
0.003 +0.002
International scientiﬁc co-publications 0.000 0.000
Top 10% most cited scientiﬁc
publications worldwide
/ 0.000
Non-EU/domestic students / 0.000
R&D expenditure in the public sector 0.003 0.000
Venture capital 0.004 0.000
R&D expenditure in the business sector 0.004 0.000
Non-R&D innovation expenditures 0.003 0.000
SMEs innovating in-house 0.003 0.000
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others 0.002 0.000
Public–private scientiﬁc co-publications / 0.000
PCT patents applications 0.007 0.000
PCT patent applications in societal
challenges
0.004 0.000
Community trademarks 0.004 0.000







Medium and high-tech product exports 0.002 0.000
Knowledge-intensive services exports 0.002 0.000
Sales of new-to-market and
new-to-ﬁrm innovations
0.000 0.000
Licence and patent revenues
from abroad
/ /







New doctorate graduates 207 0.0
Population aged 30–34 years with
completed tertiary education
132 6.0
Youth aged 20–24 years with upper
secondary level education
104 1.3
International scientiﬁc co-publications 517 0.0
Top 10% most cited scientiﬁc
publications worldwide
145 1.7
Non-EU/domestic doctorate students 160 0.0
R&D expenditure in the public sector 97 2.1
Venture capital 113 1.3
R&D expenditure in the business sector 179 0.0
Non-R&D innovation expenditures 163 6.0
SMEs innovating in-house 93 4.8
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others 84 6.1
Public–private scientiﬁc co-publications 349 0.0
PCT patent applications 217 1.2
PCT patent applications in
societal challenges
282 0.0
Community trademarks 205 12.0
Community designs 164 1.5
SMEs introducing product or
process innovations
159 0.7
SMES introducing marketing or
organizational innovations
n/a n/a
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities 147 0.54
Medium-high and high-tech product exports 132 0.2
Knowledge-intensive services exports 64 2.2
Sales of new-to-market and
new-to-ﬁrm innovations
145 15.8
Licence and patent revenues from abroad 337 0.0
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reﬂecting facts that are more resistant to any policy inter-
vention. It is therefore important to draw the ‘feasibility
space’ of the Swiss innovation policy.
4.1 Some IUS indicators need to be put in context
4.1.1 High business R&D expenditures: is there a
pharma effect? One could argue that the strong indica-
tor about business R&D expenditures is an effect of the
high specialization of Switzerland in the pharmaceutical
industry; a sector which is notoriously known for its high
business R&D intensity.
As in many countries, we observe a large company
effect in Switzerland. About three-fourth of intramural
expenditures in R&D of the business sector takes place
in large companies, while SMEs account for merely a
fourth of expenditures (Erawatch 2011, Switzerland)
(Fig. 6). However, the share of large companies in
business R&D expenditure in Switzerland is not excep-
tionally high. In Finland, the USA, and Sweden shares
are close to 85% and in Germany even 90%. But beyond
this large company effect, there is indeed a pharma/
specialization effect which is more speciﬁc. Switzerland
does have a very high share of almost 40% of business
R&D expenditure coming from the pharma industry.
This feature can create an element of fragility for the
whole system, making it quite dependent of strategic de-
cisions and economic health within one single sector of
the economy.
However, it is also important to note that the relatively
low contribution of SMEs to the indicator does not neces-
sarily mean weakness in innovation capacities of these
companies, as other indicators (for instance SMEs
introducing product or process innovations) tell us
another story (which is the quite usual story of SMEs
which are relying quite effectively on several other
sources of knowledge than in-house R&D to innovate,
e.g. by purchasing or licencing patents or buying
advanced machinery, equipment, or software).
4.1.2 What is the real meaning of the weakness ‘youth
aged 20–24 upper secondary level education’ and the
close to average ‘population aged 30–34 with tertiary
education?’ A ﬁrst nuance is that the strong indicator on
new doctorate graduates tells us that at least the features
identiﬁed by the two weak indicators should not affect the
future population of highly skilled workers (scientists and
engineers) too much as Switzerland is strongly relying on
immigration of highly skilled workers. And perhaps a
more important nuance is that these weak indicators
reﬂect (in hollow so to speak) the very strong vocational
education and training system (not captured in IUS). We
will introduce below the importance of the vocational edu-
cation and training system in Switzerland as one of the key
factors explaining the strong innovative performance of
the country.
4.1.3 Venture capital is clearly a weakness in the IUS
framework and this is not a disputable fact. However,
inferring from this indicator a statement on the ﬁnancial
conditions of the Swiss innovation system is likely to lead
to some misinterpretations. The measure of general
ﬁnancial development (private credit+capitalization
of ﬁnancial markets/GDP) places the country in top
position (ﬁrst place ahead of UK, the Netherlands,
USA, and Japan) (OECD 2012). And good ﬁnancial de-
velopment obviously facilitates company ﬁnancing—from
their creation to their growth. To summarize,
Switzerland does not have more ﬁnancing solutions spe-
ciﬁcally adapted to the life of start-ups than other
European countries (the VC indicator in IUS is weak),
Figure 4. A comparison of the SII scores evolution between leading countries (2007–2011).
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but the general ﬁnancial foundations are clearly
favourable.
4.2 New organizational principles of some IUS
indicators combined with other evidence: discovering
the critical building blocks of the Swiss innovation
system
To complete the picture offered by the IUS indicators, it is
useful to generate new insights beyond the IUS ‘observa-
tion perimeter’. It is useful here to work with some ‘organ-
isational principles’ of IUS indicators and other evidence.
When grouped together, the evidence is describing import-
ant building blocks of the Swiss innovation system. Those
building blocks encapsulate processes that strongly impact
the innovative performance of the whole system. These
processes are only partially measured within the IUS
framework.
4.2.1 Transfer of knowledge and public–private
research collaborations. IUS does not measure know-
ledge and technology transfer between public/academic
research and industry and services. The lack of a reliable
Figure 5. Current IUS performance and IUS growth performance for all countries.
Figure 6. Characteristics of business R&D spending across countries.
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and single headline indicator and the difﬁculty of data col-
lection in this area for many countries explain why such an
important measure is missing.
Partial and non-systematic evidence suggests that know-
ledge and transfer activities between universities and
industries are strengths of the Swiss innovation system.
Such evidence involves the massive presence of companies
on the campus, the high number of co-publications between
academic and industrial researchers, the numerous collab-
oration networks between universities and companies as
well as the performance of the Swiss Ofﬁces of Transfer
of Technology (TTOs). Public–private scientiﬁc co-publica-
tions are a strong indicator for Switzerland in the IUS. We
can take it as a good proxy for the importance of collabor-
ation and cooperation between academic research and
industry/services. As for TTO’s efﬁciency, we note the
presence of very effective and professional transfer struc-
tures—one per university or campus. This has been
observed thanks to the CEMI survey that revealed the
higher productivity of these entities relative to TTOs in
other European countries (Conti and Gaule´ 2009). The
questions recently raised by certain members of the Swiss
parliament regarding the effectiveness of technology
transfer in Switzerland are in our opinion unjustiﬁed.7
4.2.2 Size diversity, anchor tenant, and R&D
globalization. An important characteristic of the Swiss
innovation system is the size diversity of the private
sector involving an amazingly high number of very large
R&D intensive companies operating as global leaders in
their ﬁelds as well as a high number of innovative SMEs
(IUS indicator). Each category (large ﬁrms developing im-
portant in-house R&D activities and SMEs that are innov-
ation oriented) generates important positive externalities
and enhances the general innovation performance of the
system.
First, the anchor tenant theory explains that large R&D
intensive ﬁrms, specialized in certain technological ﬁelds,
create externalities within the local system of innovation.8
Anchor tenants enhance the national/regional innovation
system; they enhance local university research and thicken
the local market for research services and technologies by
operating on both the supply and the demand side.
Presence of anchor tenants is empirically associated with
signiﬁcant positive effect on the local innovation system.
Switzerland is beneﬁtting of the presence of anchor tenants
in most sectors in which it is specialized: pharmaceuticals,
agro-food, instrument and control, transport technology,
watch, as well as ﬁnancial and insurance services. In
section 5.1, we will simulate the impact of a relocation of
some business activities of an anchor tenant outside of
Switzerland. This impact will be measured within the
IUS framework.
Second, for innovation performance at system level,
both categories of ﬁrms (the very large companies and
the SMEs) have to be considered together (Agrawal
et al. 2010). One type of local innovation externality
generated by large ﬁrm is the spawning of spin-offs
(which often occurs due to the development of
technologies that are subsequently deemed unrelated to
the ﬁrm’s overall business). Another type of local innov-
ation externality is generated by small ﬁrms. It arises from
the demand they create for the third-party provision of
technology-oriented ancillary services that lowers the cost
of entry for others. Thus, this small-ﬁrm externality is par-
ticularly salient in the presence of one or more large ﬁrms
that have the potential to produce spin-offs. Large- and
small-ﬁrm externalities are complements, and diversity in
the sizes of ﬁrms engaged in innovation (as in the Swiss
system) is associated with signiﬁcant positive effects on the
dynamism of innovation in the country. Size distribution
of local innovators appears to be important as a whole, not
just one or other tail. One strength of the Swiss system lies
within such a size diversity (involving a signiﬁcant number
of large R&D-oriented ﬁrms). It plays an important role in
driving the performance of the Swiss innovation economy.
However, there are some possible unintended conse-
quences of this strong market structure. The presence of
a high number of large industrial labs (relative to the size
of the country) results in a high outward R&D intensity
(measured as outward R&D/total BERD). Switzerland
over time is consistently ﬁrst in terms of the overall
outward R&D intensity (well ahead of Sweden,
Germany, and USA) (European Commission 2012).
Such a feature is raising many issues. While a location of
R&D in other countries is responding to strong rationale
(large market proximity, proximity to the supply of
various R&D inputs such as highly skilled workers
including technicians, engineers, researchers and scientists,
great universities, and high-tech clusters) and has a
positive effect on these ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, the conse-
quences of such a high outward R&D intensity on the
home country are less obvious. Delocalization of R&D is
likely to deprive the home country of some of the
externalities that are potentially generated by the anchor
tenant (above). Damages could be higher if delocalization
involves R&D related to entirely new ﬁelds. In such case,
some key driving forces and coordination mechanisms
missing in the home country would impede the capacity
of the local/national system to move collectively towards
these new ﬁelds (Foray and Van Ark 2008).
This is an important issue for the Swiss innovation
capacity. The unique size diversity of innovative ﬁrms
(unique given the size of the country) is a precious
feature but is likely to increase the overall outward R&D
intensity; the consequences of which on the Swiss innov-
ation system are unclear. An important question here is
whether knowledge spillovers and other types of
externalities occur from the R&D located abroad to
other ﬁrms and universities located in Switzerland. This
question remains largely unexplored.
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4.2.3 Skill’s pyramid and labour markets. IUS captures
the highly skilled dimension of human capital well [New
doctorate graduates, top 10% most cited scientiﬁc publi-
cations, non-domestic doctorate students, employment in
knowledge intensive activities]. However, these indicators
only describe the tip of the skills’ pyramid. Therefore, the
fact that Switzerland produces the right skills pyramid is
only partially measured by IUS. The Swiss pyramid is
neither too ﬂat (a solid base of qualiﬁcation and profes-
sional skills but few elite in terms of research to produce
cutting-edge knowledge) nor too slender (the breakthrough
knowledge produced by advanced research is poorly ex-
ploited by industry in the absence of a solid foundation
of professional skills). The well-proportioned Swiss
pyramid is the result of two factors. The ﬁrst one, not
measured by IUS, involves the vocational education and
training system—a true treasure of the country! It is
characterized by dual training, something all countries
talk about but few are capable of practising. For it to
work, as demonstrated by Wolter et al. (2003), companies
have to play the game and be really training-oriented
(which involves cost and requires an organization
devoted to these learning processes). It does not seem
easy to establish the right incentives to which companies
will respond positively in terms of apprentice training and
in most countries companies are not truly training-oriented
(Mu¨hlemann et al. 2007). We must also note the existence
of a very well developed and equipped tertiary vocational
education, which means that when you opt to follow the
vocational path at a still fairly young age you can go very
far and very high.9 So much for the base of the pyramid
that gives industry access to a very well-trained population.
As for its tip, the factors that count are well captured by
IUS: they are about the exceptional attraction of the Swiss
scientiﬁc arena in the eyes of the best foreign researchers.
The high salaries naturally play an essential role but also
the openness of the system. There is not, as in France or
Italy, a system of academic corporate bodies (the National
Council of Universities that qualiﬁes or disqualiﬁes candi-
dates). Entries into the Swiss system are naturally governed
by the labour market, the supply, and the demand that
operate in each institution. This attraction and openness
produce very international campuses and areas with a high
intensity of scientiﬁc immigration.
The well-proportioned skills pyramid reﬂects a balance
between the different types of training, completed by the
system’s high degree of attraction and openness to the world’s
scientiﬁc elite. These proportions reﬂect great harmony between
advanced research and the economy’s capacity to absorb its
results, to materialize the research spill-overs.
Finally, the great vocational and training system and the
high degree of the Swiss labour market ﬂexibility are com-
plements. Flexible labour markets facilitate innovation
when the latter includes a dimension of « creative destruc-
tion » (Saint Paul 2002). The ﬂexibility of the labour
market which is a true characteristic of the Swiss
economy (OECD 2012) reduces the costs of this creative
destruction, thus encouraging innovation. But thanks to
the high quality of the training system, the social costs of
ﬂexibility are contained because of workers’ ability to
redeploy their skills across activities. Easy destruction
(good for innovation) is socially acceptable and econom-
ically efﬁcient only if individuals have acquired the
capabilities to confront constant changes and to transfer
their skills from one learning setting to another.
4.2.4 Entrepreneurship, clusters, and smart
specialization. While IUS provides an important de-
scription of strengths of the Swiss innovation capacity, it
of course does not reﬂect the industrial dynamics that
build on the various features of the system.
One important dynamic is an historical trait, apparent
throughout the 20th century—the formation, development,
and intelligent evolution of specialized clusters that combine
research and innovation capacities in a speciﬁc ﬁeld. These
clusters ensure their development, thanks to the basis of col-
lective skills and knowledge accumulated, « ﬁrst-rate indus-
trial commons » that resist delocalization. Pharmaceuticals,
watchmaking, medical technologies, control and measuring
instruments, and a few others are the « Wirtschaftswunder »,
the Swiss economic wonders, to quote the title of a recent
work (Breiding and Schwarz 2011). And yet these wonders
are not under state control insomuch as they owe nothing to
the state. They are the product of research and company
dynamics, which develop in close collaboration and
generate smart specializations, i.e. specializations generated
by an entrepreneurial dynamic that are not rigid but evolve
and change as entrepreneurs discover new opportunities
(Foray et al. 2010).
Another dynamic, much more recent, is the blossoming
of start-ups and young technological companies. This phe-
nomenon is present in IUS but not measured for
Switzerland because of data issues. This is why it is difﬁcult
to assess its importance and magnitude in Switzerland.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a kind of new technology
and innovation rush might be emerging, especially around
the two Polytechnics in Lausanne and Zu¨rich (Kenward
2011). This is the result of the high density of organizations
and institutions involved in the ﬁnancing of research, de-
velopment, the forming of companies, and their growth.
The meeting of campuses in a permanent state of efferves-
cence with very effective transfer ofﬁces, the very high
general ﬁnancial development of the economy, and
generous public ﬁnancing of coaching programmes for
new entrepreneurs produce this creative exuberance cur-
rently in evidence throughout Switzerland. These are quali-
tative facts, and it is not clear whether the start-up
phenomenon is a strong aspect of the Swiss innovation
capacity (while the dynamic of smart specialization
described above is clearly one).
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4.2.5 Summary The various building blocks described
above —(1) transfer of knowledge and public–private
research interactions; (2) size diversity and anchor
tenants; (3) skill’s pyramid and labour markets; (4) entre-
preneurships, clusters, and smart specialization—are im-
portant to know and to study. They encapsulate key
processes of knowledge transfer, human capital formation,
agglomeration economies, and smart specialization. The
way these processes are operating in Switzerland seems
to positively impact the whole innovation performance of
the country. But some elements of fragility are associated
with these various processes: there is a dark side of the
virtuous dynamics of size diversity, anchor tenant, and
positive external effects (i.e. the potential fragility created
by the highest outward R&D intensity among OECD
countries); there is a dark side as well of the strong attrac-
tion of the country towards the highly skilled workers (i.e.
a strong reliance on the global market for highly skilled
workers). All these elements of fragility will be discussed
below in section 5.
5. What are the evolutions that really matter
for policy? Thinking out of the ‘IUS box’
In this section, we again question and challenge the policy
relevance of a few indicators’ trends which are statistically
meaningful both as forces that are weakening the Swiss
position and as forces that are improving this position.
However, it is clear that the potential weaknesses identiﬁed
above are either not so relevant or will require long-run
policy intervention to ﬁx them.
It is obvious that the IUS delivers quite a pretty picture of
Switzerland’s innovation performance, in particular for recent
years! Moreover, all our statistical estimations do not show
real signs of weakening and therefore there is not so much
concern about Switzerland losing its leading position in the
near future. But again, this is what we can infer from a full
development of the statistics within the ‘narrow IUS’ point of
view. It is, therefore, useful to conclude this article with some
thoughts ‘out of the IUS box’ in order to highlight potential
weaknesses that are not easily captured by the IUS framework
while they are policy relevant.
5.1 System’s building blocks: where are the
vulnerable points?
In section 4, we proposed organizational principles of in-
dicators in order to highlight some critical processes that
impact the overall Swiss innovation capacity. We identiﬁed
four processes:
- 1 ‘knowledge and technology transfers’;
- 2 ‘size diversity, anchor tenant and R&D off shoring’;
- 3 ‘skills pyramid and labour market’;
- 4 ‘entrepreneurship, clusters and smart specialisations’.
The way these various processes are working and im-
pacting the whole innovative performance makes all of
them strengths of the system rather than weaknesses.
However, potential problems are also likely to arise from
these various processes.
The most salient potential problem is located in the
building block number 2 and concerns the unintended con-
sequence of having several R&D global leaders. This is of
course a very good thing (anchor tenant theory) but creates
issues about foreign R&D location. Partial evidence tends
to suggest that the outward R&D involves complementary
assets (to R&D located in the home country), not substitute
(Arvanitis and Hollenstein 2012). This means that if those
capacities had not been created abroad, they would not exist
in any case. However, the question remains whether such
R&D offshoring is likely to deprive the home country of
some of the externalities described in section 4.2.
In Box 1 we question the stability and robustness of IUS
in case of a major R&D relocation outside the country.
Box 1 The impact of a relocation of business activities
outside of Switzerland
Switzerland’s R&D position is considered to be sensi-
tive to that of a few large multinational companies
only. The impact of a hypothetical relocation of
R&D activities abroad can be analysed using the
IUS framework and data:
Scenario A: 25% of business R&D leaves the country
including a 25% decrease in patent applications for both
patent indicators. The innovation index would drop to
0.820 which is still signiﬁcantly above that of Sweden.
Scenario B: 50% of business R&D leaves the country
including a 50% decrease in patent applications for both
patent indicators. The innovation index would drop to
0.794 which is still signiﬁcantly above that of Sweden.
The results of both scenarios show that Switzerland
would still be the most innovative country even if a
relatively large share of business R&D activities
would be relocated abroad.
More severe scenarios could be constructed:
Scenario C1: a 25% drop in the performance scores: for
business R&D expenditures and PCT patent applications
and PCT patent applications in societal challenges and
trademarks and designs. The innovation index for
Switzerland would change into 0.800.
Scenario C2: a 25% drop in the performance scores for
the indicators listed under scenario C1 and medium-high-
tech product exports and knowledge-intensive services
exports. The innovation index for Switzerland would
change into 0.782.
Scenario C3: a 25% drop in the performances scores for
the indicators listed under scenario C2 and licence and
patent revenues from abroad and the share of product/
process innovators and the share of new-to-market and
new-to-ﬁrm sales. The innovation index for Switzerland
would change into 0.768.
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Scenario C4: a 25% drop in the performance scores for
the indicators listed under scenario C3 and the share of
SMEs innovating in-house and the share of SMEs
collaborating with others and non-R&D innovation
expenditures. The innovation index for Switzerland
would change into 0.747.
But only for scenario C4 Switzerland would lose it
position as most innovative country to Sweden, but
such a scenario is very unlikely to happen.
Another potential problem is linked to the fact that
Switzerland is strongly relying on the international highly
skilled labour market to secure the human capital supply.
A simple example shows the greater reliance of
Switzerland as compared to countries of similar size:
Switzerland and the Netherlands have got roughly the
same (high) number of ERC advanced grants in 2012 (re-
spectively, 26 and 28). But of the 28 grants going to the
Netherlands 22 grantees are Dutch citizens while only 8
grantees of the 26 going to Switzerland are Swiss citizens
(ERC 2012).10 These numbers are not necessarily ‘bad’ for
Switzerland; but they put a strong question mark behind the
future evolution of the international labour market for highly
skilled people and scientists (Wyckoff and Schaaper 2006).
6. Suggestions for improvements in the light
of the Swiss case
Towards the end of this article, it is useful to use the Swiss
case in order to develop some suggestions and ideas about
possible improvements of IUS indicator. We suggest two
areas for improvement. The ﬁrst one deals with the produc-
tion of the indicator; the second one is concerned with its use.
6.1 On the production side
Of course, every expert in the ﬁeld would have a different
idea about a key dimension which is missing (not
measured) and would make the argument that the
addition of this dimension would greatly improve the
quality of the indicator. It is clear that in the case of
Switzerland, the absence of any measure of vocational
training is a big failure. Not only is a crucial factor for
innovation performance notably in SMEs totally invisible
(and this is not a good signal for countries that greatly
need to improve their vocational training system) but
this also may create a misunderstanding and a misinter-
pretation of the rather weak performance of Switzerland
on the tertiary education indicator (our comment above,
section 4.1). Measuring and integrating vocational training
in IUS is probably an unavoidable task to improve the
relationship between the indicator and the underlying
concept of interest (and this would be true for all countries,
not only Switzerland).
6.2 On the user side
IUS needs to be taken not so much as a tool capable to
generate one single number allowing to produce a ‘clear’
rankings but rather as a heuristic framework to identify
further needs for statistical and case study-based investi-
gations. In others words, investigations and reﬂections
should not stop at the production of the IUS for a given
country but start with it!
For example, in Box 1 we use IUS to predict that the
Swiss innovation capacities is quite robust and resilient in
the sense that any major R&D relocation outside of the
country will not alter the leadership position of
Switzerland in IUS. This is an interesting result telling
something about a good property of the system which
seems to be mostly independent of the actions and
strategies of any one ﬁrm. However, Swiss policymakers
should not just take this result and sleep! What IUS is
showing here is a statistical result which has obvious limi-
tations. The best of what IUS can do here is to stimulate
further research, for example, to compare this prediction
with what happened during the last periods after a couple
of R&D relocation outside of the country (such as Merck-
Serono or Novartis moves). This is a good epistemology to
check systematically what the statistical framework
predicts with a few real-world cases which have
happened in most recent history. This is the kind of inves-
tigation that results and insights obtained within the IUS
statistical framework should stimulate.
7. Conclusion
Switzerland is one of the innovation leaders and the
most innovative country in the IUS due to a strong
all-round performance on most of the IUS indicators.
Potential areas of weakness include the educational at-
tainment level of the Swiss population, R&D expend-
itures by the public sector, venture capital, non-R&D
innovation expenditures, the share of SMEs innovating
in-house or collaborating with others, and exports of
knowledge-intensive services.
Switzerland’s position as most innovative country is a
robust ﬁnding which does not depend on the IUS
weighting scheme of assigning equal weights to each of
the IUS indicators. Simulations using different weighting
schemes favouring other countries’ best indicators keep
Switzerland in ﬁrst rank and only in a few cases the
country would drop to second rank. Simulations
allowing for a ﬁxed increase (decrease) for each indicator
in the performance of the best (worst) country show that
the impact on the Swiss IUS innovation index is minor,
except for the share of population aged 30–34 years with
completed tertiary education, PCT patent applications and
the employment share in knowledge-intensive activities.
Forecasts of current Swiss growth performance up until
2020 show that for most indicator performance is expected
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to improve.11 Only for venture capital, PCT patent appli-
cations, and exports of knowledge-intensive services we
expect that performance for Switzerland will deteriorate.
Currently there are no signs that the Swiss leading
position is under threat. On the contrary, Switzerland
has managed to improve its performance relative to the
other IUS innovation leaders.
In this article, we have also tried to think out of the IUS
box in order to identify fundamental processes and struc-
tures that are hard to observe and measure but might
strongly impact the overall innovation performance of
the country and should therefore represent critical targets
for innovation policy. We tried to explore a ‘factors’ space’
between the space of micro-evidence and data (as repre-
sented by IUS as well as the Community Innovation
Survey) and the space of narratives and success stories as
collected in journalistic works (such as what is presented in
the book ‘Wirtschaftswunder’). We have therefore
identiﬁed important building blocks that encapsulate key
processes of human capital formation, knowledge transfer,
agglomeration economies, and smart specialization. The
way these processes are operating in Switzerland seems
to positively impact the whole innovation performance of
the country—so they need to be carefully analysed and
further evidence-based policy research needs to be
carried out for each of them.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data is available at REEVAL Journal
online.
Notes
1. The authors gratefully thank two anonymous referees
for their very useful comments and suggestions.
2. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/
policy/innovation-scoreboard/index_en.htm
3. The IUS 2011 report has been used as at the time of
writing this was the most recent report available.
4. Full details are available from the authors upon
request.
5. This graph is similar to Fig. 5 in the IUS 2011 report.
6. The weakness of the indicator on SME’s collaborative
activities in the case of Switzerland seems to be due
to the fact that the Swiss data measures collabor-
ation according to a very narrow deﬁnition (R&D
cooperation) while most other countries have a
broader deﬁnition that includes a wide range of
‘networking’ activities (see Arvanitis and Hollenstein
2012: 54–5).
7. In addition to Conti and Gaule´ evidence about the
efﬁciency of Swiss TTO (relative to their European
equivalents), Arvanitis et al. (2008) use Swiss data to
show that in Switzerland, transfer of technology
activities with research institution (and/or universities)
seem to improve the innovation performance of ﬁrms
considerably both in terms of sales of new or consid-
erably improved products. The most recent survey
undertaken by B. Hotz produces similar conclusions
about the quality and efﬁciency of the knowledge
transfer activities in Switzerland.
8. The classical and initial anchor tenant example is
about the large department store in a retail shopping
centre that creates demand externalities for the other
smaller shops. The anchor tenant theory has been
extended to the context of innovation by Agrawal
and Cockburn (2003).
9. The great success of professional training in
Switzerland in turn explains the relative weakness of
the two IUS indicators that measure educational
achievement by young people. The weak scores
should not be interpreted too negatively (section 4.1)
10. These numbers cannot be taken as only reﬂecting a
stricter citizenship policy in Switzerland. Although
we could not investigate very deep in exploring the
history of citizenship for every ‘Dutch’ winner (for
legal reasons), it is clear (from the names of the
winners) that at least half of the Dutch winners are
not recent migrants who would have acquired the
Dutch citizenship recently.
11. These forecasts are not presented in this article but are
available from the authors upon request.
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